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CEO’s Inside Debt and Dynamics 
of Capital Structure
Eric R. Brisker and Wei Wang
Debt-type compensation (inside debt) exacerbates the divergence in risk preferences between the 
chief executive officer (CEO) and shareholders and, in turn, affects capital structure decisions. 
An excessively risk-averse CEO tends to use less debt than the shareholders desire, reduce debt 
quickly when the firm is overlevered, but is reluctant to increase debt when the firm is underlevered. 
We find that higher CEO’s inside debt ratio (i.e., inside debt as a percentage of total incentive 
compensation) is associated with lower firm leverage and faster (slower) leverage adjustments 
toward the shareholders’ desired level for overlevered (underlevered) firms. The CEO’s inside 
debt ratio most conducive to capital structure rebalancing is around 10% of the firm’s market debt 
ratio.
Two well-known types of agency conflicts exist within corporations: that between managers and 
shareholders (separation of ownership and control) and that between shareholders and debtholders 
(asset substitution or risk shifting). One remedy proposed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) for 
these agency problems lies in the managerial compensation structure. On the one hand, firms 
could use equity-type compensation such as stock and stock options to align managers’ interest 
with shareholders. On the other hand, debt-type compensation (sometimes called inside debt), 
including defined benefit pensions and deferred compensation, could incentivize managers to 
take debtholders’ interests into account.* 1 They postulate that a manager whose compensation 
consists of both equity and debt, similar to the firm’s debt and equity mix, would consider the 
interests of both shareholders and debtholders appropriately.
We thank an anonymous reviewer and Raghavendra Rau (Editor) for their constructive comments.
1 The term “inside debt” as used in the analytical models of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Edmans and Liu (2011) refers 
to granting the executive a straight fraction of the firm’s debt. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) confirm that certain forms 
of compensation widely observed in practice (e.g., pensions and other deferred compensation contracts) have debt-type 
payoffs and could potentially be viewed as inside debt. In this article, we use “debt-type compensation” and “inside debt” 
interchangeably. Likewise, in some places we use “inside equity” to refer to equity-type compensation.
In this article, we empirically investigate the impact of inside debt on the capital structure 
dynamics of the firm. We consider how inside debt influences excessively risk-averse chief 
executive officers (CEOs) in setting firm leverage ratios and the speed of adjustment (SOA) of 
capital structure toward shareholders’ desired level. Edmans and Liu (2011) provide an analytical 
model for deriving optimal compensation contracts, which include both inside equity and debt, 
for managers facing effort and investment (i.e., risk preference) choices. They find that while 
equity induces managerial effort, debt is part of the solution to the risk-shifting problem. In 
particular, because the value of debt hinges not only on the probability of bankruptcy, but also 
on the liquidation value if the firm fails, debt-type compensation serves as an efficient tool 
to address the risk-shifting problem and finds its place in the optimal compensation structure. 
They further determine that, in most cases, an equity bias (equity stake exceeding debt stake) in 
managerial compensation is optimal as the effort effect of equity-type compensation outweighs 
its “occasional risk-shifting” effect.
The effect of inside debt on managerial risk preference is in need of more in-depth exploration, 
especially when considering yet another type of agency problem: the divergence in risk preference 
between managers and shareholders. In the Edmans and Liu (2011) model, managers are assumed 
to be similar to well-diversified shareholders in that they are risk neutral. However, a substantial 
literature has argued that managers behave in a more risk-averse fashion than shareholders would 
prefer (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Amihud and Lev, 1981; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Hirshleifer 
and Thakor, 1992; Klein and Coffee, 1996; Holmstrom, 1999; Gormley and Masta, 2016). Thus, 
managers are more aligned with debtholders than shareholders to begin with in terms of risk 
preference. Theoretically, offering managers equity-type compensation would encourage risk 
taking and mitigate managerial conservatism, but offering them debt-type compensation would 
have the unintended effect of exacerbating this agency problem. To the extent managers face 
the same asymmetric payoff structure for their inside debt holdings as outside debtholders (i.e., 
they receive fixed payoffs if the firm is successful, but bear the loss proportionally if the firm 
fails,) managers tend to act like debtholders (Bebchuk and Jackson, 2005). As a result, managers 
compensated with high stakes of inside debt could have the tendency to adopt excessively 
conservative business policies that would compromise shareholders’ wealth.
Among the financial policies that are subject to managers’ excessive conservatism, capital 
structure is of particular interest as inside debt is hypothesized to help balance the interests of 
outside shareholders and debtholders. Cassell et al. (2012) investigation provides some prelimi­
nary evidence in this regard, but it is not the focus of their paper nor is it adequate to fully reveal 
the relationship between managerial inside debt and firm leverage. In this article, we attempt to 
conduct a focused and full-fledged investigation of this issue.
The use of debt incurs the risk of bankruptcy that is often described as increasing convexly with 
the debt ratio. Excessively risk-averse managers would avoid lifting the debt ratio to the level that 
shareholders desire. Consistent with this conjecture, Liao, Mukherjee, and Wang (2015) find that 
firms, on average, are underlevered, falling short of using debt at the shareholders’ desired level. 
Inside debt would aggravate managerial conservatism, so we hypothesize that managerial inside 
debt holdings negatively influence the firm’s financial leverage. Moreover, the more risk-averse 
the manager is, the less likely he would adjust leverage upwardly if the firm is underlevered, but 
more likely he would adjust leverage downwardly if the firm is overlevered. Thus, our second 
hypothesis is that managerial inside debt holdings negatively affect the capital structure SOA of 
underlevered firms, but positively affect that of overlevered firms.
We use the CEO’s Inside Debt Ratio as our measure of managerial inside debt holdings, 
defined as accumulated holdings of pensions and deferred compensation divided by total incentive 
compensation, where total incentive compensation includes pensions, deferred compensation, and 
the value of both stock and options. Using a sample of US firms from 2007 to 2013, we find 
that a CEO’s inside debt ratio is quite persistent and it moves in tandem with the firm’s debt ratio 
over calendar time. Over the length of the CEO’s tenure, however, the two variables exhibit a 
mirror-image relationship. These patterns indicate the presence of common firm and time factors 
that shape both the CEO’s inside debt and firm leverage, yet CEO’s inside debt may have a 
negative within-firm effect on firm leverage. The estimation of an augmented capital structure 
dynamics model using the Elsas and Florysiak (2015) doubly censored fractional dependent 
variable estimator (DPF estimator) and the Blundell and Bond (1998) system generalized method 
of moments (GMM) estimator conf irms our conjecture. We find that the CEO’s inside debt ratio 
is negatively associated with firm leverage, and a one-standard deviation increase in CEO’s inside 
debt leads to a nontrivial decrease of 1.7 percentage points in the firm’s debt ratio.
Based on the above estimates, we calculate shareholders’ desired leverage, assuming that 
institutional shareholders own all of the outstanding shares and the CEO does not hold any inside 
debt. These hypothetical values of institutional ownership and CEO’s inside debt are most likely 
to produce the capital structure that is desired by shareholders as they represent a situation where 
shareholders have a strong voice and managers’ excessive conservatism is contained by equity 
compensation. Relative to our estimates of shareholders’ desired leverage, more than 80% of our 
sample firms are underlevered. Further, we find that CEO’s inside debt holding encourages an 
overlevered firm to adjust its leverage toward the shareholders’ desired level, but impedes an 
underlevered firm from doing the same, consistent with our second hypothesis.
We address the potential endogeneity of CEO’s inside debt by: 1) controlling for fixed firm 
and time effects, as well as a large array of firm and CEO characteristics, to alleviate omitted 
variable bias, and 2) using growth in the older population (persons 65 years or older) in the state 
where the firm is headquartered and the median industry inside debt ratio as instruments. Our 
rationale for using state-level growth in the older population is that CEOs located in popular 
migration destination states for the older population (i.e., Florida, California, etc.) might stay in 
their positions longer and have less need for pensions and deferred compensation. The results do 
not change after the instruments are employed. In addition, our results are qualitatively similar if 
firm leverage is measured based on market equity or book equity. We further estimate the capital 
structure SOA in subsamples for firms with different levels of CEO’s inside debt ratios and find 
that SOA peaks when the CEO’s inside debt ratio is around one-tenth of the firm’s market debt 
ratio.
All of our findings indicate that offering debt-type compensation exacerbates managers’ exces­
sive conservatism when making capital structure decisions, which is detrimental to shareholder 
value. In the presence of the manager-shareholders conflict of interest in risk preference, optimal 
managerial compensation contracts would use less debt than postulated by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), and a deep equity bias is probably necessary.
Our work differs from Cassell et al.’s (2012) investigation of capital structure in several ways. 
First, our measure of CEO’s inside debt holding does not involve the firm’s leverage ratio and 
avoids a mechanical negative relation between the measure of inside debt and the firm’s debt ratio. 
Second, our dynamic panel model, using fixed firm effects, accounts for the strong persistence 
of capital structure (Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender, 2008). Failure to control for lagged leverage 
and unobservable firm heterogeneity would likely lead to an omitted variable bias. Additionally, 
when compared to Cassell et al.’s (2012) usage of three years of data, our longer sample period 
allows us to explore the dynamics of capital structure in a richer fashion.
I. Related Literature
Jensen and Meckling (1976), in explaining the agency cost of debt, conjecture that managers 
compensated with securities having payoffs similar to equity are incentivized to increase firm risk 
beyond levels debtholders prefer, and take actions that expropriate wealth from debtholders to 
shareholders through asset substitution. They suggest that compensating managers with securities 
having payoffs similar to debt is one way to reduce this agency cost of debt. In fact, they postulate 
that the agency cost of debt could be eliminated if the managers’ compensation structure is set 
in a ratio equal to the firm’s leverage ratio, as managers would be incentivized to consider the 
interests of both security holders appropriately.
Edmans and Liu (2011) argue that since creditors are concerned with the probability of 
bankruptcy, as well as the liquidation value when bankruptcy occurs, optimal compensation 
contracts should be sensitive to both. Debt-type compensation offers managers a payoff propor­
tional to the liquidation value when bankruptcy occurs, which incentivizes them to avoid risk 
shifting and to exert more effort in protecting, or maximizing, liquidation values when bankruptcy 
becomes likely. They derive an optimal compensation contract that uses equity compensation as 
a solution to the manager-shareholder agency problem, as it induces managerial effort, and debt 
compensation as a solution to the shareholder-debtholder agency problem, as it discourages man­
agers from risk-shifting behavior. They find that in most cases, an equity bias is optimal since 
equity is more effective than debt in incentivizing effort, even though it also causes risk shifting.
Risk-related agency conflicts also exist between managers and shareholders when undiversified 
managers have an incentive to take on less risk than is desired by diversified shareholders (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). This is because a manager’s reputation and human capital greatly hinge on 
the success of the firm he runs. In addition, ownership of the firm’s shares exposes the manager 
to substantial firm-specific risk. To offset the risk-aversion increasing effect of stock ownership, 
option-based compensation that provides a convex payoff structure is often used to encourage risk 
taking (Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006). Managers sometimes even engage in value-destroying 
actions that lower firm risk in order to reduce the incidence of negative firm outcomes that are 
personally costly to the manager.
Previous literature regarding excessive conservatism of managers indicates it impacts firm’s 
investment policy (Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992), mergers and acquisitions (Amihud and Lev, 
1981; Gormley and Masta, 2016), hedging behavior (Smith and Stulz, 1985), and capital structure 
decisions (Hirshleifer and Thakor, 1992). For instance, Gormley and Masta (2016) find that 
managers insulated by the adoption of a state-level antitakeover law engage in value-destroying, 
diversifying acquisitions that reduce their firms’ stock volatility and risk of distress.
Empirical studies of managerial inside debt in recent years have been spurred by the pervasive 
use of debt-type compensation in large US corporations (Bebchuk and Jackson, 2005) and, partic­
ularly, the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure rule in 2006 that mandates detailed 
disclosure of executive compensation structure to include pension and deferred compensation 
holdings. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) find a positive association between CEO’s inside debt 
holding and the distance to default indicating that inside debt moderates the CEO’s risk-shifting 
tendency. Other research finds that inside debt holding decreases (increases) the firm’s cost of 
debt (equity) and decreases the firm’s market risk levels (Wei and Yermack, 2011), lowers bor­
rowing costs and reduces the use of debt covenants (Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong, 2014), 
reduces accounting conservatism (Wang, Xie, and Xin, 2014), and the riskiness of the firm’s 
investment and financing policies (Cassell et al., 2012). In addition, inside debt holdings are 
positively associated with firm cash holdings (Liu, Mauer, and Zhang, 2014) and abnormal bond 
returns at merger and acquisition (M&A) announcements (Phan, 2014), and negatively associated 
with cash holding value (Liu et al., 2014) and abnormal stock returns at M&A announcements 
(Phan, 2014).
When capital structure policy is considered, the literature provides mixed results. Sundaram and 
Yermack (2007) confirm a positive relationship between the dollar amount of CEO’s inside debt 
and firm leverage, while Cassell et al. (2012) demonstrate a negative association between a CEO’s 
inside debt-to-equity ratio and firm leverage. However, due to data availability constraints, these 
initial investigations were largely cross-sectional and unable to consider the dynamics of capital 
structure that has been the core of recent capital structure studies (Flannery and Rangan, 2006; 
Lemmon et al., 2008; Faulkender et al., 2012; Morellec, Nikolov, and Schurhoff, 2012; Elsas 
and Florysiak, 2015). The cross-sectional relationship between firm capital structure and CEO’s 
compensation structure, both highly persistent, may develop simply because they are determined 
by a set of common factors. Exploring the dynamics of capital structure could mitigate this 
concern. In addition, Cassell et al.’s (2012) findings are based on the relative CEO’s debt-to- 
equity ratio, which is the CEO’s debt-to-equity ratio divided by the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio 
that could give rise to a mechanical negative relation between inside debt and a firm’s debt ratio.2 
Our measure separates CEO’s inside debt from the firm’s financial leverage and, as such, is not 
subject to the mechanical relation problem.
2 Cassell et al. (2012) acknowledge this potential drawback of their measure and warn that their “analyses investigating 
the association between the relative CEO’s debt-to-equity ratio and financial leverage should be interpreted with caution” 
(p. 592).
3 Hovakimian and Li (2012) critique the partial adjustment model as “ill-suited” citing the lack of a well-defined target. 
DeAngelo and Roll (2015), however, fit the data well with the partial adjustment model and different target formations 
supporting the validity of the model.
Our study is also closely related to the empirical literature on capital structure dynamics. The 
tradeoff theory dictates the existence of an optimal capital structure level (or range). In the event 
of a shock to capital structure, firms should rebalance their capital structure to eliminate the devi­
ation. In an effort to reveal whether and how fast firms adjust toward an optimal capital structure, 
many authors, including Fama and French (2002), Flannery and Rangan (2006), Lemmon et al. 
(2008), Huang and Ritter (2009), and Elsas and Florysiak (2015), estimate a dynamic panel par­
tial adjustment model with various estimation approaches.3 Monte Carlo simulations conducted 
by Flannery and Hankins (2013) and Dang, Kim, and Shin (2015) find that the Elsas-Florysiak 
(2015) DPF estimator and the Blundell-Bond (1998) system GMM estimator produce consistent 
estimates. Faulkender et al. (2012), Warr et al. (2012), and Liao et al. (2015) use this dynamic 
panel model to estimate target leverage. Then, in the second step, they estimate the heterogeneous 
SOAs toward this target that hinge on factors including cash flows and corporate governance. We 
will employ a similar procedure.
II. Data and Methodology
A. Variables
1. Main Variables
The key variables in this study are the firm’s capital structure and the CEO’s inside debt 
holdings. A firm’s capital structure is measured by the debt-to-capital ratio, where debt is the 
sum of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities and capital is the sum of total debt and 
the market value of common equity. The market value of equity is calculated as the product of 
the number of shares outstanding and the stock price at the end of a fiscal year. For robustness, 
we also employ the book leverage ratio, which is total debt divided by the sum of debt and 
book value of common equity, in all of our tests. We also use the alternative measure of debt 
as total liabilities plus preferred stock minus deferred taxes with the results being qualitatively 
similar.
The literature provides a few measures of inside debt with most based on the comparison 
between the CEO’s inside debt holdings and the firm’s debt holdings (Wei and Yermack, 2011; 
Cassell et al., 2012) in an effort to capture the incentive effect of inside debt. Since our purpose 
is to examine the link between inside debt and firm leverage, we remove firm leverage from the 
measure of inside debt in most of our investigation. To create an analog to our firm leverage 
measure, we use the CEO’s inside-debt-to-incentive-compensation ratio, which is the ratio of
debt-type compensation to total incentive compensation.4 Debt-type compensation is found as the 
sum of the present value of accumulated pension benefits and deferred compensation. Incentive 
compensation also includes equity-type compensation (i.e., stock holdings, restricted shares, and 
options). The value of stock is equal to the number of shares, including restricted shares, the 
CEO holds multiplied by the stock price at the firm’s fiscal year-end. Following the literature, 
particularly Cassell et al. (2012), we estimate the value of each individual tranche of exercisable 
and unexercisable options the CEO holds using the Black-Scholes (1973) option model adjusted 
for dividends based on Merton (1973). We then find the sum of these option tranche values to form 
the total value of option holdings for the CEO.5 Nevertheless, we recognize that the comparison 
between CEO’s inside debt holdings and the firm’s debt holdings is of particular interest when 
considering what level of inside debt is optimal for capital structure decisions, so we create the 
CEO/Firm Relative Debt Ratio as the CEO’s inside debt ratio divided by the firm’s market debt 
ratio. This measure is essentially equivalent to the CEO to Firm Relative Debt/Equity Ratio in 
Cassell et al. (2012). We winsorize this measure at the 99th percentile to avoid extreme values 
caused by zero or a very low firm debt ratio in the denominator.
4 For comparison with the literature, we also create an inside debt-to-equity ratio as the value of debt-type compensation 
divided by equity-type compensation. Its summary statistics, reported in Table I, are consistent with the literature.
5 For more details, please see Cassell et al. (2012) in Appendix A.
6 In alternative specifications, we use the Vega and Delta separately and all the main results remain unchanged.
2. Control Variables
There are two sets of control variables for the determination of firm leverage levels and 
firm leverage adjustments, respectively. Some firm characteristics, including firm size (Total 
Assets), the Market-to-Book Ratio, Profitability, Asset Tangibility, Depreciation, and research and 
development (R&D) expenses, are known to impact the benefits and/or costs of debt (Flannery and 
Rangan, 2006). When R&D is missing, a value of zero is used and a separate dummy variable is set 
equal to one. We also include the median value of the debt-to-capital ratio of a two-digit standard 
industrial classification (SIC) industry to control for industry effects. Corporate governance is 
controlled for using the percentage of Independent Directors on the firm’s board and Institutional 
Ownership as in Morellec et al. (2012) who find that good corporate governance encourages 
the use of debt. We control for CEO Age as in Sundaram and Yermack (2007) who determine 
that inside debt increases with the age of the CEO. Serfling (2014) also finds a negative relation 
between CEO Age and firm riskiness that could indicate older CEOs avoid using debt. CEO Tenure 
is another control as CEOs with longer tenures are more likely to be entrenched and more risk 
averse (Berger, Ofek, and Yermack, 1997; Coles et al., 2006). Finally, the CEO’s Vega/Delta Ratio 
controls for the effects of equity-type compensation on CEO risk preference. The Vega and Delta 
measure the sensitivity of the value of the CEO’s accumulated equity-type compensation to a 1% 
change in the volatility of stock prices and to a 1% change in the stock price, respectively. Similar 
to Cassell et al. (2012), we use the logarithm of the Vega/Delta ratio as a parsimonious measure.6
In the capital structure SOA model, we control for factors that the literature has identified 
as influencing a firm’s leverage rebalancing decisions. Jalilvand and Harris (1984) confirm 
that capital structure adjustment costs, and, as such, SOA, are affected by firm size. Fama and 
French (2002) contend that dividend policy is a determinant of a firm’s capital structure and 
examine SOAs for dividend payers and nondividend payers separately. Liao et al. (2015) test the 
empirical implications of Morellec et al. (2012) and find that well-governed firms exhibit faster 
SOAs as their managers are more willing to move leverage upward toward the shareholders’ 
desired level. We use the fraction of Independent Directors and Institutional Ownership as 
measures of corporate governance. CEO Age tenure, and equity-type compensation influence 
CEO’s incentives and could affect the capital structure adjustments as well. Detailed variable 
descriptions are provided in Appendix A.
B. Data
We extract information regarding CEOs’ pension benefits and deferred compensation, as well 
as their stock and option holdings, for S&P 1500 firms from the Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp 
database. The SEC expanded executive compensation disclosure requirements that mandate the 
provision of detailed information regarding executive pension benefits and deferred compensation 
began in 2006. As such, we begin our sample period in 2007. We then supplement the executive 
compensation data with annual financial data from Compustat and fiscal year-end stock price 
data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We require a firm to have all of 
the compensation, financial, and stock price data available for at least two consecutive years to 
be included in the sample. Our final sample consists of 10,015 observations for 1,874 firms from 
2007 to 2013.
C. Methodology
The conventional partial adjustment model of capital structure dynamics is:
(1)
where Lit denotes the leverage ratio of firm i at the end of period t and Δ Lit = Lit — Li,t-1 
is the adjustment in leverage during period t. Note that Dit = Lit — Li,t-1 is the deviation from 
the target leverage ratio, Lit, at the beginning of period t. eit is the error term. In this model, λ 
captures the fraction of leverage deviation that is removed in period t and this estimated coefficient 
is the SOA. When λ = 1, the adjustment is complete. Depending upon the estimator used, the 
estimated average SOA ranges from 0.10 to 0.40 (Fama and French, 2002; Flannery and Rangan, 
2006; Lemmon et al., 2008; Huang and Ritter, 2009; Faulkender et al., 2012; Elsas and Florysiak 
2015).
Following the literature, the target leverage ratio, Lit, is expressed as a linear combination of 
leverage-determining factors, Lit = βXi,t-1, where Xi,t-1 represents those factors including a 
fixed firm effect (Lemmon et al., 2008), fixed time effects, a set of time-varying firm character­
istics as mentioned earlier (Flannery and Rangan, 2006), the median industry leverage ratio, and 
corporate governance variables (Liao et al., 2015). We supplement the list of determinants with 
CEO-related variables, including age, tenure, the Vega/Delta ratio, and the inside debt ratio, to 
capture the effect of CEO compensation structure on the firm’s financial leverage. Model (1) can 
then be rewritten as:
(2)
This specification allows us to examine the effect of CEO’s inside debt on firm leverage. The 
large cross-section and short time series of financial data present great difficulties in estimating 
this dynamic panel model (for discussion, please see Iliev and Welch, 2010; Flannery and Hankins, 
2013) and the dependent variable in the range of [0, 1] further complicates this situation. Out of 
all of the existing estimators, the simulation work of Dang et al. (2015) finds that an augmented
doubly censored Tobit estimator proposed by Elsas and Florysiak (2015), dubbed DPF estimator, 
produces estimates with the greatest accuracy and efficiency. The DPF estimator, assuming a 
parametric specification for the fixed effects distribution, uses a latent variable approach to 
account for the fractional and endogenous lagged dependent variable as well as the unobserved 
firm heterogeneity simultaneously.7 Thus, we employ the DPF method as our baseline estimator 
for Model (2). In addition, because the Blundell and Bond (1998) system generalized method 
of moments (GMM) has become virtually the standard estimator in the recent capital structure 
literature (Lemmon et al., 2008; Faulkender et al., 2012; Liao et al., 2015), we also use the system 
GMM to estimate Model (2) for robustness.8
7 This approach is initiated by Loudermilk (2007) for balanced panel model estimation. Elsas and Florysiak (2015) extend 
it to the case of unbalanced panels and name it DPF.
8 Flannery and Hankins (2013), based on Monte Carlo simulations, find that the Blundell-Bond (1998) system GMM 
estimator produces consistent estimates in capital structure dynamics models. Dang et al. (2015, p. 85), notwithstanding, 
find that the system GMM estimates to be “sensitive to the presence of unobservable heterogeneity and serially correlated 
errors where their instruments become invalid.”
To probe the effect of CEO’s inside debt holdings on capital structure adjustments, we conduct 
both univariate and multivariate analyses. For the univariate analyses, we follow Faulkender 
et al. (2012) and Warr et al. (2012) to estimate Model (1) using ordinary least squares (OLS) in 
subsamples partitioned according to CEO’s inside debt holdings, with the target leverage, L*it, 
as the predicted value from Model (2). For the multivariate analyses, we modify Equation (1) as 
follows to allow for CEO’s inside debt and other factors to affect SOA: 
(3)
where Ei,t-1 denotes the CEO’s inside debt ratio and Ci,t-1 is the set of control variables dis­
cussed earlier. To the extent that macroeconomic conditions affect capital structure adjustments 
(Korajczyk and Levy, 2003; Cook and Tang, 2010), fixed time effects are controlled for with 
yearly dummies (but not reported in our tables). Note that λ1 is the primary variable of interest, 
measuring the effect of CEO’s inside debt holdings on capital structure SOA. λ2 is the vector of 
coefficients on the interaction items between the control variables and firm leverage deviations. 
Since firm leverage deviation, Dit, is generated from a first-step regression, we use bootstrapped 
standard errors (Pagan, 1984).
D. Endogeneity
The identification of the relation between CEO’s inside debt and firm leverage entails appropri­
ately addressing the endogeneity issue present in empirical corporate finance research (Roberts 
and Whited, 2013). In our case, endogeneity may arise as unobserved firm and/or CEO hetero­
geneity determines both CEO’s inside debt holdings and firm leverage. For instance, the elasticity 
of demand for the firm’s products to prices, which is often difficult to measure, is among the 
factors that determine the firm’s business risk, which, in turn, influences the firm’s capital struc­
ture policy, as well as executive compensation. As another example, an optimistic CEO might 
be more willing to use debt financing and defer his own compensation, but the CEO’s optimism 
is not observable. Lemmon et al. (2008) find that unobservable firm heterogeneity creates the 
strong persistence of capital structure that accounts for 60% of the variation in debt ratios. In 
Figure 1(a), we illustrate that the CEO’s inside debt ratio also exhibits strong persistence with 
firms that start with high (low) CEO’s inside debt ratio ending up with a high (low) CEO’s inside 
debt ratio. This implies the existence of time-invariant firm heterogeneity in the CEO’s inside
Figure 1. Firm Debt and CEO Debt Over Time
(a) The average debt ratio of firms in the three terciles (high, intermediate, and low) over time during the 
firms’ event period. Firms are classified into subsamples based on their initial debt ratio. (b) The average 
firm’s debt ratio and the CEO’s inside debt ratio in the full sample over the sample period. (c) The average 
of the same two variables over the CEO’s tenure.
debt holdings. Thus, endogeneity due to omitted variables is indeed a valid concern. In addition, 
reverse causality can be a problem. For instance, a CEO hired by a highly levered firm may be 
concerned about the long-run survival of the firm, and may be more willing to accept equity-type 
compensation than debt-type compensation.
We take a two-pronged approach to address endogeneity concerns in our model. First, in 
addition to controlling for many observable firm characteristics (e.g., firm size, Market-to-Book 
Ratio corporate governance, etc.) and CEO characteristics (e.g., age, tenure, and Vega/Delta 
ratio), we use fixed firm effects to account for unobservable firm heterogeneity.9 This practice 
would ameliorate the concern of omitted variables.
9 CEO fixed effects are not considered. The inclusion of these effects would substantially reduce the sample size and 
shorten the length of the time period for the sample firms as a large number of CEOs whose tenures do not exceed two 
years would be excluded.
10 State-level population data are from the US Census Bureau. We considered both the logarithm of increase in the older 
population and the percentage growth rate of the older population, and chose the former as the absolute change better 
reflects the scale of migration of the older population across states. Furthermore, its correlation with CEO’s inside debt 
ratio is greater in magnitude.
In addition, we employ an instrumental variable approach to establish the causality from 
CEO’s inside debt to firm leverage. We use as an instrument the growth of the older population 
(persons 65 years or old) between the 2000 and 2010 censuses in the state where the company 
is headquartered.10 CEOs in popular migration destination states for the older population, like 
Florida and California, might stay in their positions longer and have less need for pensions and 
deferred compensation. The state-level growth of the older population is negatively associated 
with the CEO’s inside debt holdings (ρ = -0.15) and is unlikely to have a direct association 
with a firm’s capital structure. Another instrument is the median CEO’s inside debt holdings of 
the two-digit SIC industry in each year (Cassell et al., 2012) as CEOs of same-industry firms 
are likely to imitate their compensation structures. In a two-stage framework, we regress CEO’s 
inside debt ratio on these instruments, as well as firm and CEO characteristics, in the first-stage 
OLS estimation and use the predicted value in the second-stage DPF estimation of Model (2).
III. Results
A. Descriptive Statistics
Table I presents the descriptive statistics of all the variables included in our tests. The firm 
market (book) debt ratio averages 0.285 (0.398) with a median of 0.241 (0.381). CEO’s inside debt 
ratio averages 0.164 with a median of 0.064 anda standard deviation of 0.212. These statistics are 
similar to Sundaram and Yermack (2007). While inside debt accounts for a very small percentage 
of total CEO incentive compensation in a majority of firms, there exists a great variation in inside 
debt holdings across firms. Consistent with this, CEO/Firm Relative Debt Ratio on average, is 
greater than one, but this is attributable to the severe skewness to the right even after winsorizing 
this variable to the 99th percentile. The median of relative leverage is 0.295, the maximum is 46.5, 
and the standard deviation is 5.4. Decomposing inside debt into pension benefits and deferred 
compensation, we find the former accounts for 9.6% and the latter for 6.8% of CEO incentive 
compensation.
The CEO Vega/Delta Ratio averages 0.417 with a median of 0.329, similar to what Cassell 
et al. (2012) report. The age of CEO ranges from 41 to 74 averaging 56. The average (median) 
CEO Tenure in our sample is 7.2 (5) years. Roughly 80% of directors are independent. Note
Table I. Descriptive Statistics
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the paper. Variables definitions are 
provided in Appendix A.
Variable Mean Median SD 1st Percentile 99th Percentile
Firm Market Debt Ratio 0.285 0.241 0.218 0 0.902
Firm Book Debt Ratio 0.398 0.381 0.245 0 0.990
CEO Inside Debt Ratio 0.164 0.064 0.212 0 0.826
CEO Debt/Equity Ratio 0.363 0.069 0.748 0 4.755
CEO/Firm Relative Debt Ratio 1.503 0.295 5.426 0 46.48
CEO Pension Benefits 0.096 0 0.171 0 0.719
CEO Deferred Compensation 0.068 0.010 0.120 0 0.608
CEO Vega/Delta Ratio 0.417 0.329 0.395 0 1.718
CEO Age 55.8 56 6.8 41 74
CEO Tenure 7.2 5 6.7 0 31
Outside Directors 0.795 0.8 0.096 0.538 0.923
Institutional Ownership 0.758 0.795 0.191 0.016 0.999
Total Assets ($million) 13,982 3,160 36,833 98 271,205
Market-to-Book Ratio 1.216 0.991 0.951 0.127 4.835
Profitability 0.113 0.111 0.105 -0.167 0.384
Asset Tangibility 0.252 0.164 0.244 0.001 0.883
Depreciation 0.038 0.033 0.033 0.000 0.143
R&D 0.020 0 0.052 0 0.215
R&D Missing Dummy 0.513 1 0.500 0 1
Dividend Payer Dummy 0.592 1 0.492 0 1
that the first percentile for the fraction of Independent Directors is 54%. Thus, essentially 
all of the firms in our sample have a majority of Independent Directors on their boards in 
compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) requirement. The lack of variation in the extent 
of board independence may obscure the differential monitoring effect of Independent Directors. 
On average, institutional shareholders own about 76% of the outstanding shares of our sample 
firms.
Our average sample firm owns assets just below $14 billion USD, commands a Market-to-Book 
Ratio of 1.216, and an operating Profitability ratio of 11.3%. Tangible assets, Depreciation, and 
R&D expenses account for 25.2%, 3.8%, and 2.0% of Total Assets respectively. About 51% of 
the sample firms do not report R&D expenses, and 59% pay dividends. In general, our sample 
firms are similar to those in the literature.
B. Firms That Do Not Use Debt-Type Compensation
Many of our sample firms use little debt-type compensation as shown in the descriptive 
statistics. Further examination finds that 3,210 firm-year observations, representing nearly one- 
third of all of the observations, have zero CEO’s inside debt. Zero inside debt most likely 
occurs when the initiation and management costs of pension and/or deferred compensation plans 
outweigh their benefits.11 Given that pension and deferred compensation plans may or may 
11 Anecdotal evidence indicates that small firms are less likely to offer pension plans than large firms due to a lack of 
resources. For instance, in 2011, in a US News & World Report article, a retirement consultant is cited, “Having a pension 
plan is a fairly complicated thing to do and you need some resources to be able to deal with it ..... A small company
probably doesn’t want to deal with all the hassle when they can sign up for a 401(k) plan fairly easily.”
not be offered for a variety of different reasons (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007), one possible 
explanation that firms avoid this type of compensation could be related to the unintended adverse 
incentive effect it offers against shareholders (i.e., the effect of aggravating managerial risk 
aversion). Overall, zero inside debt represents the censoring point of the variable. It is of interest 
to determine whether these firms are different from firms that use inside debt in their CEOs’ 
compensation packages.
In Table II, we present the comparison between firms with zero CEO’s inside debt and those with 
nonzero inside debt in terms of capital structure, inside debt, and CEO and firm characteristics. 
For each variable, the mean and median are reported for both subsamples and the differences in 
mean and median are shown in the last two columns on the right. Two sample t-tests and two 
sample Brown-Hood tests, respectively, are employed to determine the statistical significance of 
the differences in mean and median. Firms that use debt-type compensation borrow more, have 
higher CEO Vega/Delta Ratios are greater in size, more profitable, own more tangible assets, have 
lower depreciation of assets, invest less in R&D, and are more likely to pay dividends. Essentially 
larger, more mature firms are more likely to use debt-type compensation. These firms have 
relatively older CEOs, but they are not much different from their zero inside debt counterparts 
in terms of CEO Tenure, board independence, or Institutional Ownership despite the statistical 
significance of some of the differences. In short, firms that use debt-type compensation differ 
from those that do not in firm characteristics, but not necessarily in CEO characteristics and 
corporate governance.
It is worth noting that even zero inside debt firms, which commonly offer equity-type com­
pensation to their CEOs, could suffer from managerial conservatism for two reasons. First, it is 
difficult to kill two birds with one stone. While equity-type compensation often seeks to induce 
effort it unlikely cures managerial conservatism completely at the same time. Second, the risk­
shifting effect of equity compensation stems from the convexity of its payoff, which is probably 
not adequate to align managers’ preference with shareholders who face similar convex payoffs 
as managers are underdiversified when compared to shareholders. Therefore, despite their equity 
compensation, managers could still use less financial leverage than shareholders desire and be 
reluctant to adjust leverage when it is below the shareholders’ desired level.
C. CEO’s Inside Debt and Level of Firm Leverage: Univariate Analysis
We examine the correlation between the firm’s debt ratio and the CEO’s inside debt ratio in 
Table III. A fairly large positive correlation (ρ at the level of 0.2) exists between the firm’s debt 
ratio and the concurrent CEO’s inside debt ratio, as well as the lagged CEO’s inside debt ratio. 
The components of CEO’s inside debt, pensions, and deferred compensation are also positively 
correlated with the firm’s debt ratio. The change in firm’s debt ratio and CEO’s inside debt ratio 
has a positive coefficient of 0.33. All of these positive associations could stem from common 
factors that determine both variables, such as firm characteristics and time effects. When we 
review the correlations of the change in the firm’s debt ratio with both the levels of the firm’s debt 
ratio and the CEO’s inside debt ratio, we find interesting contrasts. The change in the firm’s debt 
ratio is positively associated with the level of the concurrent firm’s debt ratio and CEO’s inside 
debt, slightly negatively associated with the level of the firm’s debt ratio in the previous period 
(ρ = -0.08), but much more strongly negatively correlated with the level of the CEO’s inside 
debt ratio in the previous period (ρ = -0.27). Its correlations with lagged CEO pensions and 
deferred compensation are also negative (ρ = -0.20 and -0.19, respectively). The patterns in the 
correlations seem to indicate that despite the possible presence of common drivers for both firm
Table II. Firms with and without CEO’s Inside Debt
This table presents the mean and median of variables used for firms whose CEOs hold inside debt and 
for those whose CEOs do not hold inside debt. Two-sample t-tests and the two-sample Brown-Hood tests, 
respectively, are conducted to report the statistical significance of differences in mean and median across 
the two subsamples.
Variable
Zero Inside Debt 
(n = 3,212)
Nonzero Inside Debt 
(n = 6,803) Difference In
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Firm Market 0.254 0.195 0.300 0.254 0.046‘‘‘ 0.060‘‘‘
Debt Ratio
CEO Inside 0.000 0.000 0.242 0.181 0.242‘‘‘ 0.181‘‘‘
Debt Ratio
CEO/Firm Relative 0.000 0.000 2.213 0.766 2.212‘‘‘ 0.766‘‘‘
Debt Ratio
CEO Pension 0.000 0.000 0.142 0.036 0.142‘‘‘ 0.036‘‘‘
Benefits
CEO Deferred 0.000 0.000 0.100 0.050 0.100‘‘‘ 0.050‘‘‘
Compensation
CEO Vega/Delta 0.355 0.236 0.447 0.372 0.091‘‘‘ 0.137‘‘‘
Ratio
CEO Age 54.6 54 56.4 56 1.9‘‘‘ 2‘‘‘
CEO Tenure 7.5 5 7.1 5 -0.3‘‘ 0
Independent 0.771 0.800 0.806 0.800 0.036‘‘‘ 0.000
Directors
Institutional 0.758 0.795 0.758 0.795 0.000 0.000
Ownership
Total Assets 3,951 1,281 18,718 4,757 14,767‘‘‘ 3,476‘‘‘
($million)
Market-to-Book 1.437 1.133 1.111 0.927 -0.326‘‘‘ -0.206‘‘‘
Ratio
Profitability 0.105 0.106 0.117 0.114 0.013‘‘‘ 0.008‘‘‘
Asset Tangibility 0.210 0.116 0.271 0.184 0.062‘‘‘ 0.068‘‘‘
Depreciation 0.044 0.036 0.035 0.032 -0.008‘‘‘ -0.005‘‘‘
R&D 0.035 0 0.013 0 -0.022‘‘‘ 0
R&D Missing 0.586 1 0.478 0 -0.108‘‘‘ -1‘‘‘
Dummy
Dividend Payer 0.346 0 0.708 1 0.362‘‘‘ 1‘‘‘
Dummy
‘“Significant at the 0.01 level.
“Significant at the 0.05 level.‘ Significant at the 0.10 level.
leverage and CEO’s inside debt, CEO’s inside debt might have an impact on the dynamics of firm 
leverage.
We plot the firm’s leverage ratio and the CEO’s inside debt ratio together during our sample 
period (Figure 1b), as well as during CEO Tenure (Figure 1c). During our sample period from 
2007 to 2013, the two variables closely track each other, rising in 2008 and 2011 and declining 
in all other years. Again, this demonstrates the presence of time-related factors that affect the
Table III. Correlations
This table presents the Pearson’s correlation of the firm’s debt ratio and the CEO’s inside debt ratio in time 
t and t - 1, as well as their changes.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11)
(1) Firm Market Debt
Ratiot
(2) CEO Inside Debt 0.24
Ratiot
(3) CEO Pensiont 0.21 0.82
(4) CEO Deferred 0.13 0.59 0.03
Comp.t
(5) Firm Market Debt 0.86 0.19 0.18 0.09
Ratiot - 1
(6) CEO Inside Debt 0.20 0.82 0.70 0.46 0.25
Ratiot - 1
(7) CEO Pensiont - 1 0.17 0.70 0.84 0.03 0.21 0.83
(8) CEO Deferred 0.11 0.47 0.03 0.78 0.13 0.59 0.04
Comp.t - 1
(9) ΔFirm Market 0.08 0.33 0.24 0.24 -0.08 -0.27 -0.20 -0.19
Debt Ratiot
(10) ΔCEO Inside Debt 0.27 0.10 0.07 0.07 -0.25 -0.08 -0.07 -0.05 0.31
Ratiot
(11) ΔCEO Pensiont 0.07 0.26 0.31 0.01 -0.06 -0.20 -0.25 -0.01 0.78 0.26
(12) ΔCEO Deferred 0.04 0.21 0.00 0.37 -0.06 -0.18 -0.02 -0.29 0.64 0.18 0.02
Compt
two variables in similar ways. When plotted against CEO Tenure, interestingly, the two variables 
exhibit a discernible mirror image contrast. In the first nine years of CEO Tenure, firm leverage 
generally declines, while CEO’s inside debt holdings increases. Starting in the tenth year of a 
CEO’s tenure, the trend reverses for both variables. What drives these patterns could be related to 
a CEO’s risk aversion, but is outside the scope of this study. What it indicates about the relation 
between CEO’s inside debt holdings and firm leverage is of greater interest. A firm tends to 
make upward (downward) adjustments in financial leverage when its CEO’s inside debt holdings 
decline (rise).
Extending the probe, we examine the adjustment in firm leverage in four subsamples based 
on the lagged CEO’s inside debt ratio. Firms with zero inside debt, firms whose inside debt 
ratio is nonzero, but less than 0.15, between 0.15 and 0.30, and above 0.30. There are 3,165, 
3,183, 1,506, and 2,161 observations in these subsamples, respectively. The cutoffs are chosen 
so that the low inside debt group has about the same size as the zero inside debt group, and 
the intermediate inside debt group is of the same width for the range of the inside debt ratio 
as the low inside debt group. Partitioning firms with nonzero inside debt into terciles yields 
qualitatively similar results. Shown in Table IV, zero inside debt firms are different from other 
firms using inside debt and, on average, they essentially do not adjust their capital structures. 
Firms that use inside debt exhibit a monotonic declining trend in firm’s leverage ratio changes 
as the lagged CEO’s inside debt ratio gets higher. Firms with low CEO’s inside debt adjust their 
firm’s leverage ratios upwardly by 1.5 percentage points, those with intermediate inside debt 
adjust firm’s leverage ratios upwardly by 0.8 percentage points, and those with high inside debt 
adjust their firm’s leverage ratios downward by 1.0 percentage points. The difference in the firm’s
Table IV. CEO’s Inside Debt and Subsequent Change in Firm’s Debt Ratio
This table reports the mean and median changes in the firm’s debt ratio given different levels of lagged 
CEO’s inside debt in the full sample. The CEO’s inside debt ratio is classified into four levels: zero, low 
(lower than 0.15), intermediate (higher than 0.15, but lower than 0.30), and high (higher than 0.30). The 
differences in mean and median changes in the firm’s debt ratio and their statistical significance based on 
two-sample mean and median tests are reported.
ΔFirm Debt Ratiot








(0.30, 1) High - Low p-Value
N 3,165 3,183 1,506 2,161
Mean 0.002 0.015 0.008 -0.010 -0.025‘‘‘ <0.001
Median -0.001 0.000 -0.002 -0.013 -0.013‘‘‘ <0.001
‘“Significant at the 0.01 level.
leverage adjustment between high and low inside debt firms is statistically significant at the 
1% level. The comparison of median firm’s leverage adjustments yields a similar pattern. These 
comparisons again suggest a negative relation between CEO’s inside debt and firm leverage, and 
invite more in-depth examination of this relation.
D. CEO’s Inside Debt and Level of Firm Leverage: Dynamic Panel Model
We use Model (2) to conduct the multivariate analyses. This model not only accounts for a 
large array of control variables that are found to impact firm leverage, including observable firm 
characteristics, corporate governance, and CEO characteristics, but also controls for unobserved 
firm and time heterogeneity using lagged firm leverage and fixed firm and time effects. The 
baseline estimator is the Elsas and Florysiak (2015) DPF method that is designed to deal with 
unbalanced large-N, short-T, panel data with a fractional dependent variable.
The estimates are reported in Column (1) of Table V. First, the coefficient of lagged firm’s 
debt ratio is 0.751 implying a SOA of 0.249 consistent with Elsas and Florysiak (2015). Lagged 
CEO’s inside debt ratio, presented near the bottom, loads negatively with a coefficient of-0.079 
that is statistically significant at the 1% level. This confirms the presence of a negative relation 
between CEO’s inside debt and firm leverage, even after controlling for all other factors. A 
one-standard deviation increase (0.212) in the CEO’s inside debt ratio corresponds to a decline 
of 1.7 percentage points in the firm’s market debt ratio. This effect is not large, but it is also 
not trivial considering the mean (median) annual leverage adjustment is 0.4 (-0.2) percentage 
points.
Except for R&D, all of the firm characteristic variables significantly impact the market debt 
ratio. We find that board independence is negatively related to firm leverage, which is not 
consistent with the idea that a more independent board encourages excessively conservative 
CEOs to take on more debt. However, since all boards have a majority of Independent Directors 
after SOX, it has become less clear how Independent Directors may impact CEO monitoring. 
Consistent with Liao et al. (2015), Institutional Ownership receives a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient indicating that shareholders encourage the use of debt. CEO Age is also 
negatively associated with the firm’s debt ratio consistent with the notion that older CEOs become 
more risk averse (Serfling, 2014). The coefficient estimate for CEO Tenure is not statistically
Table V. CEO’s Inside Debt and Firm Leverage
This table presents the estimations of the dynamic panel model of capital structure. The dependent variable 
is the firm’s market debt ratio. Independent variables include the conventional set of firm characteristics 
that impact tax benefits and bankruptcy costs including firm size, the Market-to-Book Ratio, Profitability, 
Asset Tangibility, Depreciation, R&D, missing R&D dummy, and the industry median leverage. Variables 
that represent shareholders’ interests include the percentage of outside directors on a board and Institutional 
Ownership and CEO characteristics including age, tenure, the Vega/Delta ratio, and the inside debt ratio. 
Column (2) includes a dummy variable that is equal to one if the CEO does not hold inside debt in the 
previous year. The models are estimated using the Elsas and Florysiak (2015) dynamic panel dependent 
variable (DPF) estimator. Column (3) reports the second-stage DPF estimates when the state-level growth 
of the older population (65 years or older) and the industry median CEO’s inside debt ratio are used as the 
instruments for the CEO’s inside debt ratio. Column (4) provides estimates using the Blundell-Bond (1998) 
system GMM estimator. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses.
(Continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DPF DPF Two-Stage DPF GMM
Firm Debt Ratiot - 1 0.751*** 0.752*** 0.739*** 0.762***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.038)
Ln(Assetst -1) 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.032*** -0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
Market-to-Book Ratiot - 1 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** -0.013*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
Prof itabilityt - 1 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.067
(0.021) (0.021) 0.022 (0.071)
Asset Tangibilityt - 1 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.136*** -0.062
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.070)
Depreciationt - 1 -0.858*** -0.857*** -0.827*** 0.452
(0.129) (0.129) (0.131) (0.586)
R&Dt - 1 0.009 0.009 -0.002 -0.025
(0.067) (0.067) (0.067) (0.243)
R&D Missing Dummyt - 1 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.048
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.035)
Industry Median Debt Ratio 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.053*** 0.037
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.099)
Independent Directorst - 1 -0.038** -0.038** -0.037** -0.082
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.059)
Institutional Ownershipt - 1 0.080*** 0.080*** 0.072*** 0.051
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.048)
Ln(CEO Age) -0.068*** -0.068*** -0.002*** 0.092
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.109)
Ln(1+CEO Tenure) 0.002 0.002 0.001** -0.014
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.014)
CEO Vega/Delta Ratiot - 1 -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003)
CEO Inside Debt Ratiot - 1 -0.079*** -0.081*** -0.095*** -0.075**
(0.011) (0.012) (0.018) (0.034)
Zero CEO Debt Ratio Dummy -0.004*** -0.096***
(0.001) (0.032)
Constant 0.016 0.021 0.000 -0.113
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.427)
Table V. CEO’s Inside Debt and Firm Leverage (Continued)
‘“Significant at the 0.01 level.









Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald χ2 33,817 33,825 32,870 2,332
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
different from zero. This is not surprising given the inverse V-shape pattern between CEO Tenure 
and firm leverage as shown in Figure 1(c). Surprisingly, the CEO Vega/Delta ratio is negatively 
related to the firm’s market debt ratio indicating that CEOs who have equity-type compensation 
that is more sensitive to the volatility of the firm’s stock price and/or less sensitive to the change 
in the firm’s stock price tend to avoid the use of debt financing.12
12 This is inconsistent with the notion that Vega encourages risk taking (Guay, 1999; Coles et al., 2006). Notwithstanding, 
Cassell et al. (2012) obtain a similar negative and statistically significant relationship between the CEO Vega/Delta Ratio 
and the firm’s book leverage (see their table VI).
13 We conduct the Finlay, Magnusson, and Schaffer (2013) weak instrument tests to check the validity of these instruments 
in the DPF (Tobit) context. We obtain a 95% confidence interval of [-0.117, 0.029] for the coefficient of CEO’s inside 
debt ratio (the coefficient estimate is -0.095), and an overidentification test J-statistic of 2.10 with a p-value of 0.147. In 
addition, both instruments have a fairly strong correlation with the CEO’s inside debt ratio (-0.15 and 0.41, respectively), 
and the first-stage regression yields an adjusted R2 of 0.275. All of these results indicate that our instruments are valid. 
Please find the first-stage estimation in Appendix B.
14 We use lags 2 to 5 of levels and differences as instruments and also treat CEO’s inside debt, Independent Directors, 
Institutional Ownership, and the CEO Vega/Delta Ratio as endogenous.
In Column (2), we consider firms that offer no debt-type compensation to their CEOs separately 
by including a dummy variable that is equal to one for firms offering zero inside debt, and 
zero otherwise. The dummy variable receives a negative coefficient of-0.004 that is statistically 
significant at the 1% level indicating that these firms do use less debt financing, but the difference 
is fairly small. All other results remain nearly the same.
Then, we directly address the potential endogeneity concerns pertaining to CEO’s inside debt 
even after controlling for firm and CEO characteristics, unobservable firm and time heterogeneity, 
and the lagged independent variable. Our approach is to use growth of the older population in the 
state where the firm is headquartered and the median CEO’s inside debt ratio of the industry as 
instruments.13 Specifically, we run an OLS regression of the CEO’s inside debt ratio on the two 
instrument variables and all other control variables used in Model (2), and then use the predicted 
value of the CEO’s inside debt ratio in the previous period to replace the CEO’s inside debt ratio 
in Column (1). We then estimate the second-stage model using the DPF estimator. The results are 
presented in Column (3). The CEO’s inside debt ratio obtains a coefficient of -0.095, statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Thus, after controlling for potential endogeneity, we find that CEO’s 
inside debt negatively affects the firm’s leverage ratio.
As a robustness check, we also apply the widely used Blundell-Bond (1998) system GMM 
estimator to Model (2) and report the estimates in Column (4). This approach uses a vector of 
lagged levels and differences of the dependent variable to address the problem of the persistent 
regressor. It also confers the convenience of using similar instruments for endogenous variables.14 
Although most control variables do not have coefficients that are significantly different from zero, 
two main results hold unchanged. First, the SOA is 0.238. In addition, the CEO’s inside debt ratio 
loads negatively with a coefficient of -0.075. Moreover, the zero CEO’s inside debt dummy 
receives a statistically significant, negative coefficient of a larger magnitude, -0.096. Thus, the 
system GMM estimator produces results consistent with the DPF estimates.
E. Shareholders’ Desired Leverage
Morellec et al. (2012) hold that self-interested managers have target leverage that is below 
the shareholders’ desired level. Liao et al. (2015) verify this claim empirically. To the extent 
that CEO’s inside debt holdings escalate the shareholders-manager divergence in risk preference, 
the positive (negative) coefficient on Institutional Ownership (CEO’s inside debt ratio) we have 
obtained above is consistent with their findings. Institutional shareholders would like to see higher 
firm leverage, while CEOs with inside debt tend to keep firm leverage at a lower level. These 
incongruous incentives have profound implications for the target leverage estimation. Since 
managers are hired by shareholders to run the company, the level of leverage that maximizes 
shareholder wealth should be the target leverage. In other words, a firm should move its financial 
leverage toward the shareholders’ desired level. This level is different from the predicted value 
in Model (2) where CEOs’ private interests could distort capital structure choices. In fact, the 
target leverage to maximize shareholder wealth can be achieved only if the CEO’s interests are 
perfectly aligned with shareholders’. Based on this idea, we estimate the shareholders’ desired 
leverage using the coefficients in Column (1) of Table V, assuming institutional shareholders 
own all outstanding shares and CEOs are compensated with equity, but no inside debt. When 
Institutional Ownership is one and CEO’s inside debt is zero, shareholders have a strong voice 
in the firm’s policies and CEOs are subject to a lower level of (or ideally no) conservatism. The 
latter is true as equity-type compensation encourages risk taking and debt-type compensation that 
could worsen managerial conservatism is nonexistent. Then it is most likely that CEOs’ capital 
structure decisions are consistent with what shareholders desire, and our ad hoc estimates reflect 
the shareholders’ desired leverage.
Appendix C reports the summary statistics of our estimated shareholders’ desired leverage 
and deviation from this target leverage. The mean (median) of this measure is 0.316 (0.275), 
0.035 (0.039) higher than the actual market debt ratio. Relative to the shareholders’ desired 
leverage, 8,054 firm-year observations are underlevered and merely 1,961 are overlevered. The 
predominance of underlevered firms is evidence of the divergence of incentives between the CEOs 
and shareholders, consistent with our conjecture that excessively conservative CEOs intentionally 
keep firm leverage low.15
15 On average, firms are underlevered due to managerial conservatism. Individual firms, though, might witness temporary 
overshoots in leverage due to “shocks,” such as an unexpected market price decline. The overlevered situation may also 
emerge if a firm decides to issue a large amount of debt, rather than selling small amounts of debt in several issues, when 
expecting growing market capitalization in the future. The overlevered situation may last for quite a long time if it is the 
result of financial distress as the firm may find it difficult to raise equity capital and reduce debt. 
F. CEO’s Inside Debt and Capital Structure Adjustments
As shown in Liao et al. (2015), the sign of leverage deviation could influence the CEO’s 
attitude toward capital structure adjustments. Since the CEO’s desired leverage is lower than that 
of shareholders, both the CEO and the shareholders would like to lower firm leverage when 
leverage is above the shareholders’ desired level. If leverage is below the shareholders’ desired 
level, however, the shareholders would want to boost leverage to the desired level, while the CEO
Table VI. CEO’s Inside Debt and Subsequent Change in Firm’s Debt Ratio Given 
Leverage Deviations
This table presents the mean and median changes in the firm’s debt ratio given different levels of lagged 
CEO’s inside debt in the subsamples of underlevered (Panel A) or overlevered (Panel B) firms, respectively. 
The CEO’s inside debt ratio is classified into four levels: zero, low (lower than 0.15), intermediate (higher 
than 0.15, but lower than 0.30), and high (higher than 0.30). The differences in mean and median changes 
in the firm’s debt ratio and their statistical significance based on two-sample mean and median tests are 
reported.
‘“Significant at the 0.01 level.
ΔFirm Debt Ratiot








(0.30, 1) High - Low p-Value
Panel A. Underlevered Firms
N 2,282 2,603 1,305 1,864
Mean 0.027 0.028 0.018 0.007 -0.021‘‘‘ <0.001
Median 0.000 0.006 0.001 -0.007 -0.013‘‘‘ <0.001
Panel B. Overlevered Firms
N 883 580 201 297
Mean -0.062 -0.045 -0.056 -0.120 -0.075‘‘‘ <0.001
Median -0.054 -0.039 -0.050 -0.100 -0.061‘‘‘ <0.001
may not. To the extent that inside debt holding aggravates the CEO’s excessive conservatism, 
higher inside debt holding would give rise to faster adjustments toward the target leverage in the 
overlevered domain, but impede adjustments in the underlevered domain.
To test this hypothesis, we first partition the underlevered firms and overlevered firms separately 
into four subsamples of firms with zero, low, intermediate, and high levels of the lagged CEO’s 
inside debt ratio, and then consider their leverage adjustment patterns in the subsequent year. 
Table VI presents the results. Overall, underlevered firms adjust leverage upward, overlevered 
firms adjust leverage downward, and the magnitude of the adjustment is dependent upon the 
CEO’s inside debt holdings. On average, in the underlevered domain (Panel A), firms with low 
CEO’s inside debt holdings adjust their market debt ratio upward by 2.8 percentage points, firms 
with intermediate CEO’s inside debt holdings adjust by 1.8 percentage points, and those with 
high CEO’s inside debt holdings adjust by merely 0.7 percentage points. The medians present a 
similar pattern. The differences in mean and median adjustments across the high and low CEO’s 
inside debt subsamples are statistically significant at the 1% level. In the overlevered domain 
(Panel B), firms with low, intermediate, and high CEO’s inside debt holdings adjust their debt 
ratio downward by 4.5, 5.6, and 12.0 percentage points, respectively. In short, CEO’s inside debt 
holding speeds up leverage adjustments from above the shareholders’ desired level, but impedes 
adjustments from below the shareholders’ desired level.
A rigorous examination of the effect of CEO’s inside debt on the firm’s leverage adjustments 
is based on Model (3), where target leverage is the shareholders’ desired level and the capital 
structure SOA is allowed to vary with CEO’s inside debt and other factors. As discussed in Section 
II.A, control variables include certain firm characteristics, CEO characteristics, and corporate 
governance measures. We estimate the model in the full sample and then in the subsamples of 
Table VII. CEO’s Inside Debt and Capital Structure Adjustments
The table reports the results from estimating the model: ∆Lit = (λ0 + λ 1 Ei,t -1 + λ2 Ci,t - 1) Dit + Ɛit in 
the full sample and two subsamples: firms where the market debt ratio is above the shareholders’ desired 
level (“Overlevered”) or below this level (“Underlevered”). In the model, Dit denotes the deviation from the 
shareholders’ desired market leverage of firm i at the start of period t. Ei,t -1 represents the CEO’s inside debt 
ratio. Ci,t - 1 are a set of control variables including the CEO Vega/Delta Ratio, age, tenure, outside directors, 
Institutional Ownership, firm size, and dividend payer indicator, as well as year dummies (coefficients not 
reported). λ1 and λ2 are coefficients on the interaction items between CEO leverage and firm leverage 
deviation, and those between the control variables and the firm leverage deviation, respectively. A dummy 
variable that indicates zero CEO’s inside debt is also considered in Specification (2). Bootstrapped standard 
errors are reported in brackets.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
“Significant at the 0.05 level.







(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
CEO Inside Debt Ratiot - 1 0.069 0.113 1.942‘‘‘ 2.018‘‘‘ -0.272‘‘‘ -0.289‘‘‘
(0.138) (0.141) (0.371) (0.446) (0.085) (0.091)
Zero CEO Inside Debtt - 1 0.057 0.067 -0.027
(0.064) (0.184) (0.064)
CEO Vega/Delta Ratiot - 1 0.023 0.024 0.004 0.004 0.010 0.009
(0.017) (0.017) (0.042) (0.043) (0.019) (0.018)
CEO Aget 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.006 -0.002 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.004)
CEO Tenuret 0.004 0.004 -0.006 -0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011) (0.004) (0.003)‘
Independent Directorst - 1 0.023 0.030 0.696 0.731 -0.048 -0.050
(0.182) (0.182) (0.791) (0.791) (0.173) (0.173)
Institutional Ownershipt - 1 0.590‘‘‘ 0.603‘‘‘ -0.536 -0.520 0.703‘‘‘ 0.697‘‘‘
(0.125) (0.125) (0.350) (0.353) (0.118) (0.117)
Log(Assets)t - 1 -0.030‘‘ -0.026‘ -0.061 -0.057 -0.014 -0.016
(0.013) (0.014) (0.043) (0.046) (0.012) (0.013)
Dividend Payert - 1 -0.354‘‘‘ -0.343‘‘‘ -0.011 -0.004 -0.093‘ -0.098‘
(0.058) (0.059) (0.153) (0.153) (0.052) (0.053)
Constant -0.041 -0.126 0.934 0.817 -0.386 -0.345
(0.260) (0.282) (0.918) (0.979) (0.238) (0.259)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.176 0.176 0.274 0.274 0.165 0.165
overlevered and underlevered firms separately. We also consider a slightly different specification, 
Specification (2), where firms with zero CEO’s inside debt holdings are treated specially with a 
dummy variable. Table VII reports the results.
In the full sample, CEO’s inside debt receives statistically insignificant coefficient esti­
mates regardless of the specification, but these near-zero coefficients conceal the real effect 
of CEO’s inside debt as demonstrated below. In the overlevered subsample, the coefficient of 
the CEO’s inside debt ratio is 1.94, statistically significant at the 1% level. This indicates that 
higher CEO’s inside debt holdings are associated with faster adjustments toward the share­
holders’ desired level. This association is economically very large. A one-standard deviation
increase (0.212) in the CEO’s inside debt ratio would accelerate the SOA by about 0.40, hold­
ing all else equal. In the underlevered domain, however, the CEO’s inside debt ratio obtains 
statistically significant, negative coefficients of approximately -0.28, indicating that a one- 
standard deviation increase in the CEO’s inside debt ratio slows down the SOA by nearly 
0.06, still an economically large effect. In Specification (2), the results are qualitatively un­
changed. The opposite signs of the CEO’s inside debt coefficient estimates in the over- and 
underlevered domains are consistent with our expectations that CEO’s inside debt holdings ex­
acerbate their excessive conservatism. Consequentially, CEOs are eager to reduce the use of 
debt when the firm is overlevered, but reluctant to increase the use of debt when the firm is 
underlevered.
G. Optimal CEO’s Inside Debt Holdings for Capital Structure Decisions
Debt-type compensation for managers alleviates the conflict of interest between managers 
and debtholders and lowers the agency cost of debt, but exacerbates the divergence in attitude 
toward risk between managers and shareholders. Identifying this tradeoff may help in determin­
ing an inside debt level that is optimal for capital structure decisions and CEO’s inside debt 
holdings that facilitate the fastest capital structure adjustment toward the shareholders’ desired 
level.
Given the positive correlation between the CEO’s inside debt ratio and the firm’s debt ratio, 
the CEO/Firm Relative Debt Ratio defined as the CEO’s inside debt ratio divided by the firm’s 
market debt ratio, is relevant for answering this question.16 Using the relative ratio rather than 
the absolute CEO’s inside debt ratio also helps answer the question whether an equity bias in 
executive compensation is beneficial (Edmans and Liu, 2011). Our strategy is to estimate the 
capital structure SOA in subsamples based on different levels of CEO/Firm Relative Debt Ratio 
and find at what level we obtain the greatest SOA. We first single out the 3,210 firm-year 
observations with zero CEO’s inside debt as the first subsample. We then divide firms having a 
positive CEO/Firm Relative Debt Ratio that is below the median of 0.295 into two subsamples, 
(0, 0.10], and (0.10, 0.295]. Finally, the remaining observations having above median CEO/Firm 
Relative Debt Ratio are partitioned into five quantiles. These cutoffs give rise to seven subsamples 
that include six with roughly equal numbers of nonzero relative debt ratio observations. The SOA 
is estimated using Model (1), where leverage deviation is that from the shareholders’ desired 
level.
16 The CEO/Firm Relative Debt Ratio is set to its median value, 0.295, in case both the numerator and denominator are 
zero. The results do not change if we exclude observations with a zero CEO’s inside debt ratio and a zero firm’s debt ratio.
The estimated SOAs are presented in Table VIII. In Panel A, the SOA is 0.764 for zero inside 
debt firms, and jumps to 1.091 for firms with relative debt ratios below 0.1. The SOA declines 
to 0.960 in the next subsample and keeps declining monotonically to 0.083 in the last subsample 
with the highest CEO/Firm Relative Debt Ratio. The SOA peaks when the CEO’s inside debt 
ratio is around 10% of the Firm Market Debt Ratio.
The CEO-shareholders divergence of risk preference is more pronounced when upward adjust­
ments are needed. Thus, we repeat the above SOA comparisons in the subsamples of underlevered 
firms. The cutoffs for forming the subsamples are the same. Panel B of Table VIII reports that the 
estimated SOA exhibits an identical pattern where it rises considerably from the zero inside debt 
subsample to the (0, 0.10] domain, and then monotonically declines as the CEO/Firm Relative 
Debt Ratio increases. Thus, with regard to capital structure adjustments, we find the optimal 
CEO’s inside debt holdings are very low, at around 10% of the firm’s market debt-to-capital 
ratio.
Table VIII. Capital Structure SOAs Given Different Relative CEO/Firm Debt Ratios
This table presents the estimated speeds of adjustment (SOAs) in subsamples defined by the relative CEO/firm debt ratio. The SOA is estimated in the 
second-stage regression ΛLit = λ Dit + Ɛit, where ∆Lit is the change in firm i-s leverage ratio in period t, Dit represents the deviation from the shareholders’ 
desired leverage of firm i at the start of period t, and λ is the SOA. The model is estimated using OLS. Firms with zero CEO’s inside debt constitute a subsample. 
Firms with nonzero CEO’s inside debt are classified into seven roughly equal-sized subsamples based on the value of the CEO’s inside debt ratio/firm debt ratio. 




nside Debt Ratio/Firm Debt Ratio
(0.295,0.569] (0.569,0.900] (0.900, 1.343] (1.343,2.301] (2.301, ∞)
Panel A. Full Sample
Nobs 3.210 871 925 1.003 1.001 1.002 1.001 1.002
Estimated SOA 0.764 1.091 0.960 0.823 0.783 0.609 0.310 0.083
R2 0.122 0.196 0.149 0.136 0.112 0.098 0.061 -0.031
Panel B. Underlevered Firms
Nobs 2,289 599 683 800 850 913 950 970
Estimated SOA 0.522 0.874 0.830 0.714 0.704 0.535 0.263 -0.030
R2 0.015 0.057 0.061 0.073 0.063 0.055 0.046 -0.027
Table IX. CEO’s Inside Debt and Firm Book Leverage
This table presents the estimation of the dynamic panel model of capital structure. The dependent variable 
is the firm’s book debt ratio. Independent variables include the conventional set of firm characteristics that 
impact tax benefits and bankruptcy costs including firm size, Market-to-Book Ratio, Profitability, Asset 
Tangibility, Depreciation, R&D, missing R&D dummy, and the industry median leverage. Variables that 
represent shareholders’ interests include the percentage of outside directors on a board and Institutional 
Ownership and CEO characteristics including age, tenure, the Vega/Delta ratio, and the inside debt ratio. 
Column (2) includes a dummy variable that is equal to one if the CEO does not hold inside debt in the 
previous year. The models are estimated using the Elsas and Florysiak (2015) dynamic panel dependent 
variable (DPF) estimator. Column (3) provides the second-stage DPF estimates when the state-level growth 
of the older population (65 years or older) and the industry median CEO’s inside debt ratio are used as 
the instruments for the CEO’s inside debt ratio. Standard errors are reported in the parentheses. Wald test 
chi-squares of the model are reported at the bottom.
(Continued)
(1) (2) (3)
FPD FPD Two-Stage FPD
Firm Debt Ratiot - 1 0.767*** 0.763*** 0.753***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Ln(Assetst -1) 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Market-to-Book Ratiot - 1 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Profitabilityt - 1 0.005 0.004 0.003
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Asset Tangibilityt - 1 0.154*** 0.154*** 0.148***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Depreciationt - 1 -0.266** -0.263** -0.237*
(0.122) (0.122) (0.123)
R&Dt - 1 -0.285*** -0.286*** -0.293***
(0.063) (0.063) (0.063)
R&D Missing Dummyt - 1 -0.021* -0.021* -0.021*
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Industry Median Debt Ratio 0.072*** 0.074*** 0.072***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Independent Directorst - 1 -0.034** -0.034** -0.033
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Institutional Ownershipt - 1 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.022**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Ln(CEO Age) -0.016 -0.015*** -0.005
(0.020) (0.020) (0.004)
Ln(1+CEO Tenure) 0.002 0.002 0.008*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
CEO Vega/Delta Ratiot - 1 -0.002* -0.002* -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
CEO Inside Debt Ratiot - 1 -0.017* -0.019* -0.064***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.023)
Zero CEO Debt Ratio Dummy -0.008**
(0.003)
Constant 0.056 0.071 -0.041*
(0.053) (0.054) (0.022)
Table IX. CEO’s Inside Debt and Firm Book Leverage (Continued)
*** Significant at the 0.01 level. 
**Significant at the 0.05 level. 







Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Wald χ2 23,095 22,854 21,850
Prob > χ 2 0.000 0.000 0.000
This result echoes Edmans and Liu’s (2011) insight that an equity bias is often optimal. Edmans 
and Liu (2011) envision that even when managers are risk neutral and excessive conservatism is 
irrelevant, an equity bias is desired to induce effort. In the presence of managerial conservatism, 
a greater equity bias would be beneficial as its risk-shifting effect encourages managers to take 
risks.
A caveat is in order. While our investigation is only from the angle of capital structure 
decisions, debt-type compensation also affects other aspects of corporate policies as docu­
mented in the literature, which would, in turn, impact firm value. In particular, pensions are 
offered for purposes other than providing incentives, such as building manager-firm “bonding” 
(Sundaram and Yermack, 2007), mitigating shirking to avoid costly losses in retirement pay 
due to early termination (Lazear, 1979), and enabling firms more control over retirement pay­
outs (Lazear, 1979, 1983). Thus, we should not view the inside debt level that is conducive to 
the optimal capital structure decision as equivalent to the optimal level that maximizes firm 
value.
H. Robustness Check with Book Leverage
All of our results thus far are based on the market debt ratio. Some of the literature (Faulkender 
et al., 2012) uses the book debt ratio arguing that book leverage is more likely to be under the 
control of managers. We examine the effect of the CEO’s inside debt ratio on the level and 
SOA of firm book leverage in Tables IX and X, respectively. In Table IX, where the results 
from estimating Model (2) are reported, lagged firm’s debt ratio receives highly significant 
coefficient estimates of around 0.76, while the lagged CEO’s inside debt ratio receives statistically 
significant, negative coefficient estimates between -0.017 and -0.064, regardless of the model 
specification (i.e., exclusion or inclusion of the zero inside debt dummy) or estimation approach. 
In Table X, CEO’s inside debt commands positive coefficients that are marginally statistically 
significant in the overlevered subsample, but negative and statistically significant coefficients in 
the underlevered subsample. The results are qualitatively similar to those based on market debt 
ratio.
I. Which Matters, Pensions or Other Deferred Compensation?
Between pension plans and other deferred compensation, the former resembles unsecured 
debt more closely as supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs) are often unfunded and 
unsecured. In contrast, with some special arrangements, deferred compensation may be invested 
in equity and withdrawn flexibly before retirement. Thus, the incentive effect of pensions may 
be stronger than that of deferred compensation. Consistent with this, Anantharaman et al. (2014)
Table X. CEO’s Inside Debt and Adjustments of Book Leverage
The table reports the results from estimating the model: ∆Lit = (λ0 + λ 1 Ei,t -1 + λ2 Ci,t - 1) Dit + Ɛit in 
the full sample and two subsamples: firms where the book leverage ratio is above the shareholders’ desired 
level (“Overlevered”), or below this level (“Underlevered”). In the model, Dit denotes the deviation from the 
shareholders’ desired book leverage of firm i at the start of period t. Ei,t -1 represents the CEO’s inside debt 
ratio. Ci,t - 1 are a set of control variables including the CEO Vega/Delta Ratio, age, tenure, outside directors, 
Institutional Ownership, firm size, and dividend payer indicator, as well as year dummies (coefficients not 
reported). λ1 and λ2 are coeff icients on the interaction items between CEO leverage and firm leverage 
deviation, and those between control variables and firm leverage deviation, respectively. A dummy variable 
that indicates zero CEO’s inside debt is also considered in Specification (2). Bootstrapped standard errors 
are reported in brackets.
***Significant at the 0.01 level.







(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
CEO Inside Debt Ratiot - 1 0.097 0.088 0.424 0.557‘ -0.363‘ -0.518‘‘
(0.206) (0.214) (0.325) (0.337) (0.195) (0.210)
Zero CEO Inside Debtt - 1 (0.010) 0.145 -0.175
(0.078) (0.109) (0.111)
CEO Vega/Delta Ratiot - 1 -0.003 -0.003 -0.016 -0.016 0.004 0.002
(0.018) (0.018) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
CEO Aget -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
CEO Tenuret -0.003 -0.003 -0.008 -0.007 -0.002 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Independent Directorst - 1 0.538‘ 0.535‘ 0.520 0.563 0.453 0.411
(0.301) (0.301) (0.443) (0.442) (0.406) (0.403)
Institutional Ownershipt - 1 0.106 0.104 -0.424 -0.417 0.548‘‘‘ 0.518‘‘‘
(0.185) (0.185) (0.317) (0.317) (0.189) (0.190)
Log(Assets)t - 1 -0.073‘‘‘ -0.073‘‘‘ -0.090‘‘ -0.079‘ -0.060‘‘ -0.072‘‘‘
(0.023) (0.024) (0.042) (0.043) (0.024) (0.024)
Dividend Payert - 1 -0.027 -0.028 -0.068 -0.045 0.080 0.063
(0.068) (0.068) (0.092) (0.091) (0.097) (0.098)
Constant 0.553 0.569 1.191‘ 0.987 0.066 0.385
(0.401) (0.414) (0.641) (0.647) (0.520) (0.549)
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.074 0.074 0.072 0.073 0.061 0.062
find that higher debt-type compensation leads to lower promised yield and fewer covenants in 
corporate loans, but this effect is caused entirely by benefits accrued under SERPs. It is of interest 
to examine whether the debt-reduction effect of inside debt is attributable solely to pensions, but 
not to deferred compensation.
We investigate this question first in Model (1) by using the pension to total incentive com­
pensation ratio and the deferred compensation to total incentive compensation ratio in place of 
the total CEO’s inside debt ratio. Both ratios load negatively with a coefficient that is of similar 
size (about -0.08) and are statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, pensions or deferred 
compensation have similar effects on the level of financial leverage. Then, we estimate Model
(2 ) using the two component inside debt ratios and find, similar to the results in Table VII, 
that both ratios load negatively (positively) in the regression for the underlevered (overlevered) 
subsample. In either subsample, the coefficient of pension to the incentive compensation ratio 
is greater in magnitude than that of the deferred compensation to the incentive compensation 
ratio, and is of greater statistical significance. Thus, as both pensions and deferred compensation 
encourage faster capital structure adjustments in an overlevered situation and impede adjustments 
in an underlevered situation, the effect of pensions is somewhat stronger than that of deferred 
compensation.17
17 These results are available upon request.
IV. Conclusions
Since Jensen and Meckling (1976), it has been argued that both equity and debt compensation 
should be included in managerial compensation contracts in order to incentivize managers to take 
both shareholders’ and debtholders’ interests into account when making financing and investment 
decisions. Edmans and Liu (2011) theoretically derive an optimal compensation contract that 
uses equity compensation as a solution to the manager-shareholder agency conflict, as it induces 
managerial effort, and debt compensation as a solution to the shareholder-debtholder agency 
conflict, as it incentivizes managers to avoid risk shifting that transfers wealth from debtholders 
to shareholders.
In this article, we investigate the impact of CEO’s inside debt holdings on capital structure 
dynamics. We find that the CEO’s inside debt ratio, measured using both pension plans and 
deferred compensation data, is negatively associated with firm leverage. We then estimate share­
holders’ desired leverage where shareholder wealth is maximized and examine how CEO’s inside 
debt affects the firm’s SOA toward this level for overlevered and underlevered firms. We find 
that greater CEO’s inside debt holdings spur an overlevered firm to adjust capital structure at 
a more rapid pace toward its shareholders’ desired level, but impedes such adjustments for an 
underlevered firm. Finally, estimating the capital structure SOAs in subsamples of firms hav­
ing different levels of CEO’s inside debt ratios, we find that the CEO’s inside debt ratio that 
is conducive to optimal capital structure dynamics is around 10% of the firm’s market debt 
ratio.
This article is the first to empirically investigate the impact CEO’s inside debt has on cap­
ital structure dynamics. Our findings indicate that debt-type compensation exacerbates man­
agers’ excessive conservatism that leads to lower than optimal use of debt and slower capital 
structure adjustments toward shareholders’ desired level, which is detrimental to shareholders’ 
interests.
Since managers, even without inside debt, tend to be more risk averse than shareholders, 
they are aligned with debtholder interests to some extent. A main purpose served by debt­
type compensation is to align the interest of managers with debtholders, but only at the ex­
pense of shareholders as it increases the divergence in risk preferences between managers and 
shareholders. Thus, the optimal compensation structure is unlikely to be similar to the firm’s 
capital structure as Jensen and Meckling (1976) conjecture, and a large equity bias (Edmans 
and Liu, 2011) is probably necessary. This finding has profound implications concerning the 
design of executive compensation packages. While pensions and deferred compensation may 
serve good purposes, firms should also take note of their adverse effects on managers’ risk 
attitudes.
Appendix A: Variable Definitions
Variable Definition
Firm Market Debt Ratio Total book debt/(total book debt + market equity), where total 
debt is the sum of long-term debt and notes payable, and 
market equity is found as the product of the number of 
shares outstanding and share price at the fiscal year-end.
Firm Book Debt Ratio Total book debt/(total book debt + book equity), where total 
debt is the sum of long-term debt and notes payable.
CEO Inside Debt Ratio CEO’s inside debt holdings, including pension and deferred 
compensation, divided by total compensation. Inside debt 
holdings are the sum of the present value of accumulated 
pension benefits and deferred compensation. CEO total 
compensation also includes the value of stock and stock 
options. Stock value is calculated by multiplying the number 
of shares held (including restricted shares) by the stock price 
at the firm’s fiscal year-end. Following Cassel et al. (2012), 
we apply the Black-Scholes (1973) option valuation formula 
for each individual tranche of options held by the CEO and 
sum the tranche value to a grand total.
CEO Debt/Equity Ratio CEO’s debt-type compensation divided by equity-type 
compensation.
CEO/Firm Relative Debt Ratio CEO’s inside debt ratio/firm debt ratio. It is set to the median 
value (0.295) in case both CEO’s debt ratio and firm’s debt 
ratio are zero, and set to the 99th percentile value (46.48) if 





CEO pension benefits divided by total compensation.
CEO deferred compensation divided by total compensation.
The ratio of the Vega (the sensitivity of the value of the CEO’s 
accumulated equity-based compensation to a 1% change in 
the volatility of stock prices) to the Delta (the sensitivity of 
the value of the CEO’s accumulated equity-based 
compensation to a 1% change in the stock price) (Grant, 
Markarian, and Parbonetti, 2009). Vega and Delta are 





The age of the CEO.
The tenure of the CEO.
The percentage of independent directors on the board.
The percentage of common shares owned by institutional 
investors.
Total Assets ($million) 
Market-to-Book Ratio
Total assets in million 2005 constant dollars.
(Market value of common equity + book value of debt + 
preferred stock - deferred tax and investment tax 







Operating income before depreciation divided by total assets. 
Property, plant, and equipment divided by total assets. 
Depreciation and amortization divided by total assets.
R&D divided by total assets. Set to zero if missing.
Equal to one if R&D is not reported, and zero otherwise. 
Equal to one for dividend payers, and zero for nonpayers.
Appendix B: First-Stage Estimation for Two-Stage DPF
This independent variable is the CEO’s inside debt ratio. The OLS estimation is reported in 
this table. The predicted value is lagged before being used in the second-stage DPF estimation as 
the instrument for lagged CEO Inside Debt Ratio.
*** Significant at the 0.01 level.
**Significant at the 0.05 level.
Independent Variable Coefficient SE t-Value
Firm Debt Ratiot _ 1 0.055*** 0.011 5.003
Ln(assetst -1) 0.023*** 0.001 17.972
Market-to-Book Ratio t _ 1 -0.009*** 0.002 -3.739
Profitability t _ 1 0.007 0.022 0.301
Asset Tangibilityt _ 1 0.039*** 0.010 3.974
Depreciation t _ 1 -0.307*** 0.076 -4.066
R&D t — 1 -0.146*** 0.045 -3.261
R&D Missing Dummyt _ 1 0.009** 0.004 2.002
Industry Median Debt Ratio -0.110*** 0.018 -6.071
Independent Directorst _ 1 0.164*** 0.019 8.572
Institutional Ownershipt- 1 -0.022** 0.010 -2.308
Ln(CEO Age) 0.004*** 0.000 13.888
Ln(1+CEO Tenure) -0.001*** 0.000 -2.748
CEO Vega/Delta Ratiot — 1 0.014*** 0.001 11.212
Old Population (Age 65 or Above) Change 2000-2010
in State -0.044*** 0.004 -10.314
Industry Median CEO Inside Debt Ratiot _ 1 0.614*** 0.021 29.946
Constant -0.136*** 0.034 -4.071
Adjusted R2 0.275
Appendix C: Shareholders’ Desired Beverage
This table presents the summary statistics of the estimated shareholders’ desired leverage 
and the deviation from this target leverage at the start of the period. The shareholders’ desired 
leverage is estimated based on Model (2), using coefficients from Column (1) of Table V, and 
assuming the Institutional Ownership is one and CEO’s inside debt ratio is zero. For details, 
please see Section III.E.
shareholders’ desired 
leverage
Variable Mean Median SD 1st percentile 99th percentile
Shareholders’ desired debt 0.316 0.275 0.196 0 0.845
ratiot
Firm Market Debt 0.281 0.235 0.217 0 0.134
Ratiot - 1
Deviation from 0.035 0.039 0.048 -0.104 0.134
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